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 This paper approaches innovation from an evolutionary perspective.  Literature spanning a 
broad range of traditions in economics is considered, to include Institutionalist, Schumpeterian, 
post-Keynesian, and growth theorists.  Key systemic changes are examined in the context of 
prevailing technological and social institutions. It is argued that expectation-fixing effects such 
as path-dependence in investment and innovation provide structure to a social network of 
market institutions that seek to validate money contracts.  The institution of money is 
considered as a center of power in the system and affects the course of innovation.  Money as 









 Robert Heilbroner's description of economics as The Worldly Philosophy could not be more 
insightful.  For Heilbroner, economics presents a system of thought that seeks to categorize and explain 
the behavior not of heavenly gods, but rather worldly men.  The ―propensity to truck, barter and trade
1
‖ 
reflects the being which must apply clever tricks to avoid the cold indifference of nature.  In this way, 
economics is inextricably linked to the study of human ingenuity.  This unique trait has allowed Homo 
sapiens to bend the constraints of its physical environment.  Unlike any other species, which  evolve as 
a whole population through a stochastic process of natural selection with respect to a particular habitat, 
humans apply learned techniques in an effort to change conditions to fit the needs of the group, and by 
extension the species.  As well as passive adaptation through variation in offspring, humans possess the 
art of tool manipulation – an active process that increases the likelihood of group survival.    
Anthropological evidence confirms the importance of innovation in techniques through cultural 
artifacts, placing innovation at the center of humanity. 
 This paper seeks to explain key aspects of the role of innovation in the history of economic 
thought, with a particular focus on money as both a force that shapes the evolution of dynamic 
processes and the object of inventive activity.  Moreover, this inquiry strives to further our 
understanding of innovation through an analysis of its linkages to the economic processes which drive 
systemic evolution.  In a world where time flows in only one causal direction, changes in technology 
today forever alter the future conditions that underlie a large economic system.  Further, changes 
reverberate throughout the system in an ongoing process of cumulative causation, creating a non-
                         
1 
 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
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deterministic future highly sensitive to the initial conditions of the emergent state.  The concept of 
cumulative causation is a key insight into the dynamic, evolutionary nature of economic systems, 
which institutional economists have brought to high level of refinement.  Thorstein Veblen in, ―Why is 
Economics  Not an Evolutionary Science?‖ (1898, pg. 139) frames the problem at hand: 
―The ways and means, material and immaterial, by which the native proclivities work out their ends, 
therefore, are forever in a process of change, being conditioned by the changes cumulatively going 
forward in the institutional fabric of habitual elements that govern the scheme of life.‖ 
Hall and Whybrow (2008) argue that Veblen’s emphasis on the interplay between the ―material and 
immaterial‖ reconciles economics as a science with the philosophy of evolutionary change
2
.   
The importance of a new technique, tool or process within the larger cultural and social milieu is of 
profound interest if we are to reconcile notions of progress and change in terms of the market.  Veblen 
again makes this point in his own words: 
―What is true of the individual in this respect is true of the group in which he lives.  All economic 
change is a change in the economic community – a change in the community’s methods of turning 
material things to account.  The change is always in the last resort a change in habits of thought.  A given 
contrivance for effecting certain material ends becomes a circumstance which affects the further growth 
of habits of thought – habitual methods of  procedure – and so becomes a point of departure for further 
development of methods of compassing the ends sought and for the further variation of ends that are 
sought to be compassed.‖ 
 Veblen shows that innovation in the ―community’s methods of ―turning material things to 
account ―(italics added for emphasis) – a change in the mode of production per se – results in an 
                         
2   Hall and Whybrow connect Veblen’s conception of cumulative causation with the 
synechist approach C.S. Peirce, a father of the Pragmatist School.   
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alteration of society’s institutional ―habits of thought.‖  Moreover, these changes set the stage for a 
permanent departure from the present state.  From here we may envisage innovation in its larger, 
evolutionary societal context. 
 This analysis draws upon the insights of several schools of thought within the economics 
discipline in order to establish a framework capable of integrating innovation into the large set of 
economic processes.  We begin with the recognition that economic systems evolve over time in a 
process which remains non-teleological in nature.  In other words, we are concerned with a system that 
changes through time based upon the cumulative interaction of its constituent elements, steered through 
time by historical precedent, not by rational conceptions of natural, immutable states of equilibrium.   
Historical events -themselves the consequence of an earlier set of conditions — serve to shape the 
nature of emergent states.  The interplay between the present situation constrained both by the physical 
world and social institutions, and the reaction of the same in the form of innovation, reverberate in a 
feedback loop of causality.  The evolutionary conception of change places innovation in a dual role as 
both a reflection of the violence of social change and cause for further adaptation. 
 An evolutionary approach to innovation must consider the contribution of Joseph Schumpeter 
on the subject of the business cycle.  Schumpeter's (1934) seminal work The Theory of Economic 
Development embeds innovation within a larger, evolutionary context that seeks to account for the 
dynamic forces that provide the bittersweet creative destruction of progress.  Schumpeter (1934, pg. 
58) argues the emergent state of an economic system must be understood in terms of the previous state 
of the entire system, not just those elements commonly regarded as economic.  The force for 
Schumpeterian change springs forth from innovations made successful by the entrepreneur, accounting 
for the change in the business cycle along with a new era of investment activity.  Through new 
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combinations of technique and finance, innovations emerge to reshape the circular flow of resources 
economy wide.   
 As Schumpeter (1934, pg. 64) meticulously stresses, the processes working to reshape the 
circular flow of the economy emerge endogenously from within the system. While defining economic 
development, Schumpeter leaves us with this famous insight into the cumulative effect of endogenous 
change: 
―...what we are about to consider is that kind of change arising from within the system and which so 
displaces its equilibrium point that the new one cannot be reached from the old one by infinitesimal 
steps.  Add successively as many mail coaches as you please, you will never get a railway thereby.‖ 
(author’s italics) 
 Thus, Schumpeter lays out the importance of uncertainty and time in explaining economic 
change.  The inherent complexity in the social system of production suggests an infinite range of 
possible emergent states, all distinctly representative of innovations upon the original state.  Therefore, 
accidents of history which led to, for example, the development of the key constituents of railroad 
technology – e.g. steel production, the steam engine, eminent domain – jointly determine the path of 
innovation.  Successive improvement and diffusion of the mail coach does not imply convergence 
towards the railroad. 
 In order to conceptualize the dynamic processes affecting the manner and nature of innovation 
through history, we employ the Social System of Accumulation framework developed within the recent 
neo-Marxist literature.  Emanating from the seminal work of David Gordon, Richard Edwards and 
Michael Reich (1982), Social Structure of Accumulation (hereafter SSA) theory attempts to explain 
long-wave cycles of capitalist history.  SSA theory points to  distinct periods of accumulation and 
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stagnation to a holistic arrangement of institutional factors, which provide periods of relative stability.    
Moreover, the particular network of institutional factors which constitute the SSA break down over 
time, giving way to a period of stagnation and the dissolution of that particular structure.  As the market 
undergoes a new period of expansion and accumulation, a new SSA emerges to carry on in a new 
period of relative stability. 
 Additionally, our analysis integrates the role of money in the form and function of the SSA as a 
stabilizing set of institutions.  This approach adopts the post-Keynesian (PK) formulation of 
endogenous money theory (EMT), which presents a systematic approach to explaining how flows of 
credit money through the economy affect production.  While we touch on some of the key concepts of 
EMT in our treatment of innovation under the organizing effect of a SSA, a thorough exposition of the 
heterodox theory of money shall be dealt with in Part 4.   
 Traditionally, mainstream economics takes a narrow view of the importance of innovation in 
accounting for growth and change.  This is not to suggest that orthodoxy ignores the effect of 
innovation on economic change, only that they hold technological change as separate from the material 
lives of human beings and their overall relation with the production process.  This distinction relegates 
innovation as an exogenous effect on the larger economic system.  In contemporary literature, 
innovation results in changes in total factor productivity, so that processes that account for changes in 
the production process are lost in the ―black box‖ of the residual to the  two pillars of growth that are 
capital and labor.     While efforts have been made to break open the ―black box‖ of innovation, much 
of the importance of the innovation process itself has been ignored.  However, recent research in the 
literature that focuses on innovation offers promise for new revelations on the endogeneity of 
innovation led growth. 
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 Despite the reluctance to embrace an evolutionary approach to methodology, neoclassical 
growth literature has produced a robust and wide-ranging body of knowledge pertaining to the 
determinants of the Industrial Revolution.  Several explanations seeking to establish a causal 
foundation for the onset and timing of the Industrial Revolution are considered within the growth 
literature, such as the role of religion and history. 
 Joel Mokyr provides a framework for understanding the process of innovation from an 
epistemological approach.  Mokyr proposes that changes in technology result from an interplay 
between propositional knowledge and prescriptive knowledge.  Mokyr defines propositional knowledge 
as the set of all ―useful information,‖ to include science, philosophy, religion and other habits of 
thought.  Essentially, propositional knowledge serves to create an epistemological basis for culture;A 
ready pool of insight into future contemplation.  Prescriptive knowledge refers to information relating 
to technique.  The production of flour via the windmill serves as an example of prescriptive knowledge.  
Knowledge that the windmill operates in accordance with the weather can be categorized as 
propositional knowledge.  The distinction lies in applicability.   
 Part one of this paper explores the role of innovation in bringing about the Industrial 
Revolution, as an example of an era of innovation to which economists have paid a great deal of 
attention.  Through Mokyr’s framework we divide the Industrial Revolution into periods possessing 
distinct relations between propositional and prescriptive knowledge.  First we show that inventions 
prior to 1800 were characteristic of an era that lacked the epistemic maturity to embrace innovation as 
an integral process in the economic system.  Mokyr points out, often inventions emerged despite a lack 
of understanding of its fundamental, physical properties.  Following 1800, advances in the natural 
sciences allowed for a wider base of knowledge enabling innovation based upon deliberate, scientific 




 In addition to the emergence of major technological innovation, the Industrial Revolution 
hosted cultural innovation through institutional change.  Central changes include the emergence of 
legal establishing well-defined property rights, and the enforcement of contract.  The emergence of the 
factory as an organizing principle in society becomes an important determinant of change.  
Additionally, the factory creates a demand for capital intensive innovation. 
 In part two we introduce SSA Theory.  We shall argue that SSAs serve to stabilize expectations 
of firms with regard to the future determination of prices and profits, allowing sophisticated planning at 
the organizational level.  Contrary to the notion that firms simply respond to the sovereign will of the 
consumer through market signals, which holds for production of simple, low tech commodities for the 
market during the Laissez Faire era, the behavior of firms in the wake of the Industrial Revolution 
suggests the need to orchestrate production to reflect perceived conditions in the future.  The Industrial 
Revolution brought to bear on the market the sort of innovations – e.g. the railroad, electrical 
production, etc. -  which heralded an age of goods produced using large-scale heavy capital.  Capital 
intensive production implies a considerable degree of risk which must be attenuated in order to induce 
investment well ahead of prospective profits. 
 We shall explore the connections between the institutionally determined, expectations-fixing 
effects consistent with the SSA approach as well as the  post-Keynesian conception of endogenous 




.  It shall be argued 
that the result is a tendency towards path-dependence in investment and capital formation. 
 In part three of this inquiry we examine institutional innovation, in light of the philosophical 
                         
3 Here I propose expectations-fixing to be a quality of certain effects, devices or techniques 
which stabilize the outlook of an uncertain future. 
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insights of John Dewey and the theoretical implications of path-dependence, as it relates to social 
milieu. The central argument of this section is the notion that institutional innovation results in an 
asymmetrical distribution of effective power within social networks
4 
, resulting in a nexus of rigid 
institutions that seek to preserve the existing order.  We shall examine this effect and discuss some of 
the central challenges of technological improvements that make possible further access to the social 
network, in the absence of requisite institutional adaptation.   
 Part 4 examines the role money plays in a market economy and its effect on innovation.  The 
post-Keynesian conception of money starts with a rejection of the Quantity Theory of Money (QTM).  
Chief proponents of this approach argue that the QTM is suitable merely as an accounting tool to 
measure in money terms what is essentially a barter economy.  Since the market is not a barter 
economy, but rather a monetary economy, the central tenet of the QTM - the supposed neutrality of 
money principle - fails to hold.  In a monetary system of production, nominal interest rates matter, as 
well as the means by which liquidity is supplied to those requiring it. 
 Money plays a special role in the larger study of innovation through history of our socio-
economic system, where major innovations enter the market through the creation of credit and the 
establishment of forward contracts based upon expected flows of revenue.  This thesis argues that 
money is the most important institution in a social system that organizes production and distribution 
through market based institutions.  L. Randall Wray (2006, pg. 185) points to a key revelation by 
Keynes that a central determinant of the manner in which money flows through the economy, stems 
from the uneasiness implied by an uncertain future; possession of cold, hard cash ―lulls our 
                         
4 Effective power in this case refers to the relative influence a central node 
exerts over the network. 
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disquietude.‖  In turn the rate of return on an asset that requires one to surrender that liquidity, offers 
some base indication of the level of anxiety associated with the possibility that unforeseen events will 
render the investor insolvent.   
 At an economy wide scale, the cumulative effect of individual desires to hoard money may 
prevent investment at levels that fully employ the resources of the economy.  Under these conditions, 
the scope and nature of innovation and its diffusion through the economy reflects the desire to create 
inventive ways of ensuring a necessary level of liquidity to validate liability structures through the time 
schedule of a set of annuities.  Once money reaches a stage of institutional primacy, it undergoes a 
process of innovation as it evolves under the influence of the market demand for liquidity.   
  





Part 1:  Innovation During the Industrial Revolution 
 
 Economists have long pondered the questions:  Why did the Industrial Revolution occur when it 
did, and for what reason?  Several schools of thought have sought to solve the problem.  Mokyr  (1985, 
pp.  3-5) identifies four schools of thought on the subject of the Industrial Revolution:  The Social 
Change School, Industrial Organization School, Macroeconomic School, and the Technological School.  
We shall briefly example each approach in turn.  The Social Change School emphasize the role of 
major institutional shifts in bringing about conditions amenable to market production.  The emergence 
of the market itself ushered provided conditions of the burst of innovation typical of the Industrial 
Revolution.  Second, The Industrial Organization School argues that size and scale of the firm in the 
pursuit of industrial production was a key determinant during the period.  Mokyr suggests that the 
Macroeconomic School follows in the tradition of Kuznets through their emphasis on aggregate 
variable.  While this study is concerned with macro-effects of innovation on social change we are less 
concerned with aggregate macro variables here.  Lastly, the Technological School suggests that changes 
in technique account the period of magnificent innovation.   
 More broadly we argue that an epistemological approach explains the processes characteristic 
of major systemic change.  The aim of this section is to analyze the Industrial Revolution in terms of 
the innovative process.   The innovative process consists of the interplay between propositional 
knowledge
5
 and prescriptive knowledge
6
, where the former provides an epistemic base
7
 by which the 
                         
5 Set of all knowledge held of science, myth, philosophy, etc. 
6 The information describing a technique or set of instructions.  An invention is 
a new element of prescriptive knowledge. 
7 Epistemic base refers to the scope of a knowledge within a social network.  
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latter may rest.  This base can be thought of as a measure of certainty in adopting a new technique.  
Additionally, the ―width‖ of the epistemic base implies a level of cost in its accession as well as the 
reliability of the technique.  It is argued that Mokyr's knowledge framework effectively shows the 
dynamic nature of innovation during the Industrial Revolution. 
 Mokyr divides the Industrial Revolution into two distinct periods:  Pre and post 1800.  The 
former is regarded as period in which the epistemic base of propositional knowledge was insufficient in 
providing emergent prescriptive knowledge an environment where it might gain permanence.  As a 
result many micro-innovations lacked a necessary level of diffusion required to become a stable part of 
the system.  Likewise, Mokyr argues that innovations emerging in the latter period found stability in 
respectively wider epistemic bases, allowing for wider diffusion of the knowledge embodied in 
emergent technique. 
 We shall consider both periods of innovation as presented by Joel Mokyr in the context of the 
Industrial Revolution.  Additionally, we attempt to describe the role of culture in determining the rate of 
innovation. 
Innovation prior to 1800 
              Before 1800 the base of propositional knowledge was too narrow to support the widespread 
diffusion of many innovations. Mokyr (2002, pg. 19) argues that innovations in technique prior to 1800 
typically lack a sufficiently large base of awareness in science and philosophy to support its sustained 
implementation.  More specifically, the reliability of propositional knowledge and its ability to 
correctly evaluate the performance of a technique had not yet reached the level required to develop the 
type of innovation likely to invite further, sustained and responsive micro-innovation.  In other words, 
                                                                                    
Narrow implies majority ignorance of some possible knowledge. 
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in the absence of a solid working set of useful knowledge of the governing forces of the natural world, 
a technique would likely fail to invite further improvements, due to a lack of understanding of the 
practical nature of the innovation in the first place.  Additionally, with a limited epistemic base for a 
particular innovation, non-scientific attempts frequently yielded negative, costly results. 
              In an uncertain world where people must hedge against an unknowable future, ―tightness‖ of 
knowledge in the propositional base serves to attenuate the perception of risk.   As the gains in science 
are proven in marvelous of human engineering, the reliability of propositional knowledge increases.  In 
a market economy liquidity is required to secure the desired flow of resources for consumption or 
production needs.  Therefore, any commitment of resources to an endeavor – such as undertaking 
process innovation – carries a degree of risk that the outcome of the application of the innovation might 
result in a failure to increase productivity, thereby rendering it difficult to maintain the desired level of 
liquidity.  An innovation in technique is always an undertaking involving a considerable degree of risk, 
since the extant set of techniques remains ready for combination with the capital instead committed to 
innovation. 
              The Industrial Revolution rests on the shoulders of what Mokyr (2002, pg. 35) defines as the 
Industrial Enlightenment.  The Industrial Enlightenment can be described as those elements of the 
Enlightenment that account for an expansion to the set of knowledge practical for the pursuit of 
industry.  Mokyr (2002, pg. 84) points to advances in thermodynamics, geology, mechanics, hydraulics, 
electromagnetism, and soil science as elements of the Industrial Enlightenment.  Further, Mokyr (2002, 
pg. 37) suggests that the spillover effects from scientific activity during the period created a culture, 
mindset and set of methods all embodied in the pursuit of science, thrusting knowledge into the public 
domain.  The collaborative, peer-reviewed nature of the scientific method serves to make the claims of 
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the scientist public, resulting in the creation of a public good from the scientific process.  As a non-
depleting good the access costs of scientific information diffused more rapidly throughout 
communication networks, swelling the epistemic base for future technological evolution. 
 Communication networks emerged to connect scientific ideas to the minds of practical 
engineers.  In response to the advances in the natural sciences, Mokyr (2002, pg. 45) argues that there 
was a growing urge to share the information freely.  Institutions such as The Society of Arts in 1754 and 
the Royal Institute in 1799, serve as examples of efforts to take knowledge and place it in the public 
domain.  These institutions performed the function of reconciling science with common experience 
through language and expression.  The presentation of scientific findings takes on a role of cultural 
significance; the ritual becomes the basis by which the fidelity of subsequent innovation rests.  
Additionally, standardization in measurement and mathematical precision allowed scientists to 
collaboratively engage in inquiry within networks capable of further diffusion. 
  Innovation post 1800 
              Increases in the vast library of propositional knowledge following 1800 marks a change in the 
process of innovation.  Beginning in 1860 what Mokyr (2002, pg. 85) calls the Second Industrial 
Revolution frames a period of where innovation was the result of deliberate, applied science.  The 
techniques had the advantage of tight epistemic bases resulting in sustained micro-innovation.  Major 
innovations were now possible in light of advancements in the physical sciences and mathematics.  
Furthermore, wider diffusion of innovations are possible thanks to the billowing effect of the 
presentation of scientific proceedings in the public forum. 
 Major innovations were made possible by a widened base of propositional knowledge.  Mokyr 
(2002, pg. 86) offers as a prime example the Bessemer process of 1856.  By then advancements in 
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chemistry were sufficient to provide Henry Bessemer, and other process innovators, with the insight to 
identify the causal linkages present in the very techniques under experimentation.  While Bessemer's 
approach did not start with the goal of adjusting the carbon content to produce steel, he certainly 
recognized that it his blasting process was responsible for achieving the desired results.  Moreover, 
Mokyr (1990, pg. 116) highlights the importance of the broad base of available knowledge as a 
determinant in the ongoing evolution of an emergent technique, by pointing to the refinement of 
Bessemer's process by the British steelmaker Robert Mushet.  Accessible knowledge in chemistry 
allowed Mushet to discover that an alloy of manganese, iron, and molten ore served as a recarburizer, 
adding much needed quality to the cheap steel developed with the Bessemer process. 
 In similar fashion, refinements in thermodynamics allowed engineers to understand how the 
engine worked, not simply that it did.  Mokyr (2002, pg. 87) suggests that successful development of a 
new technique does not require understanding into the physical properties: 
―Good mechanical intuition coupled to a sound experimental method was, up to a point, a good 
substitute for formal science and helped James Watt to transform a crude and clumsy contraption into a 
universal source of industrial power...But the epistemic base that could help analyze and explain the 
efficiency of such engines did not exist.  John Farey, the best expositor of the steam engine, still 
regarded the steam engine in 1827 as a vapor-pressure engine rather than a heat engine.‖ 
The ability during this era to understand the fundamental aspects of a physical process meant that the 
technician, inventor, scientist or engineer could actually approach a problem with an informed opinion 
about the future results of their experimentation.  The lens of ingenuity came into focus.    
 As a result, further improvements in engine design led to breakthrough levels of efficiency, 
power and adoption in other industrial applications.  Engines were notoriously inefficient prior to 
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Watt's improvements.  Von Tunzelmann et al(2000, pg. 193) attribute the price of coal as a major 
determining factor in the diffusion of steam engines, resulting in geographical adoption patterns which 
placed the Newcomen engine near cheap coal.  Indeed, until subsequent efficiency boosting micro-
innovations, the steam engine remained co-located with coal mines that both fueled the engine and 
required its pumping service.  As engines increased in fuel efficiency the binding ties of costly fuel 
administration were lessened, offering promise in locomotion, mechanization and electrical generation. 
 
 Culture and Technological Change 
 In Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics, Nathan Rosenberg argues that culture 
supported and encouraged innovation in Western Europe during its period of industrialization.  
Rosenberg (1982, pg. 8) that Western Europe possessed ―a different kind of rationality;‖ particularly 
complementary to the fundamentals of the capitalist mode of production.  The willingness of Europe to 
absorb and apply techniques from foreign social groups, Rosenberg (1982, pg. 12) suggests, 
contributed greatly to the rate of innovation. 
 Rosenberg argues that the gradual replacement of institutions favoring the rule of law over the 
arbitrary whims of an autocratic regime stabilized the perception of risk with respect to innovation.  As 
discussed previously, the decision to innovate takes place in a world of uncertainty.  Since there are 
costs associated with undertaking the effort to improve upon an existing process or to invent an entirely 
new technique outright – existing processes can always be applied to a familiar problem with a 
reasonable expectation regarding the outcome – it doesn’t seem unreasonable that shaky expectations 
about the future might dissuade the inventor from taking such a risk. 
 Philosophy played a key role in creating the cultural backdrop for innovation.  As John Dewey, 
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in Philosophy and Civilization, argues that philosophy and culture remain systemically interconnected.  
Dewey writes: 
―Philosophy thus sustains the closest connection with the history of culture, with the succession of 
changes in civilization.  It is fed by the streams of tradition, traced at critical moments to their sources in 
order that the current may receive a new direction; it is fertilized by the ferment of new inventions in 
industry, new exploration of the globe, new discoveries in science.  But philosophy is not just a passive 
reflex of civilization that persists through changes, and that changes while persisting.  It is itself a 
change; the patterns formed in this junction of the new and the old are prophecies rather than records; 
they are policies, attempts to forestall subsequent developments.‖ 
 Dewey suggests an active role for philosophy in the process of cultural change.  It has been 
argued by Mokyr (2002, pg. 170) and Rosenberg (1982, pp. 8-12) that variations in religious 
philosophy determine rates of technological change.  Pointing to Lynn White's exhaustive comparison 
of religions, Rosenberg (1982, pg. 8) points out that Christianity
8
 held ideals which were particularly 
complementary to the needs of capitalism: objectification of labor, parsimony, a world-view that man 
remains separate and distinct from nature.  Most notably, the justification through Christianity – which 
White terms ―the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen‖ - that humans enjoy eminent 
domain over all trophic resources on Earth.   
 Religion aside, Enlightenment philosophers like John Locke and Francis Bacon espoused ideas 
and values, which were both the cause and reflection of a culture of innovation.  Institutions such as 
private property, protection by law, enforceable contracts, free inquiry and enterprise serve to form 
customs within a market paradigm.   
                         
8 White's Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis, contrasts Christianity, ancient 
paganism, and pan-Asian religions. 
Innovation, Markets, and Evolution 
 
18 
 In a social system organized around market institutions and a culture which attaches ownership 
to innovation, innovation then becomes more than just the means to the end of an improvement, but 
rather an end of its own as a profit making endeavor.  Indeed, culture develops artifacts which display 
its symbols of virtue; in the case of the Industrial Revolution we have the yeoman tinkerer.  This heroic 
archetype beams the values of market success:  ingenuity, boldness, craft, and thrift. 
 Our task remains to gain insight into the role of innovation in a modern market economy.  This 
section has sought to place innovation in an historical context, focusing primarily on the Industrial 
Revolution.  While this only begins to tell an interesting story about innovation, we have seen that 
change in knowledge through the innovation of technique can never be reversed.  The continuous dance 
between the known set of useful knowledge and techniques which utilize such knowledge can become 
unstable, and a virtuous cycle in knowledge generation amplifies to break free from the punctuated 
equilibria of the previous period.   
 As applied to the Industrial Revolution, the relationship between propositional and prescriptive 
knowledge can be divided into two phases: Before and after 1800.  Prior to 1800 innovations suffered 
from narrow, albeit widening epistemic bases.  Following the amplifying effects of the Enlightenment 
on the set of propositional knowledge, along with lower access costs, more macro-innovations emerged 
to provide a basis for ongoing micro-innovation.  A positive feedback cycle between useful knowledge 
and innovation set off a dramatic explosion in technological and cultural change. 
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Part 2:  Social Structures of Accumulation and Innovation 
 Consistent with the larger theme of this study on the dynamic aspects of innovation in an 
economic system, we must account for the change in the innovation process over time.  The causal 
feedback between culture and technology implies a continuous process of co-evolution.  As technology 
changes so does culture in a manner consistent with both the history of the previous relationship, but 
the emergent state as well.  Therefore, the processes that allow for the diffusion of innovation through 
the economy at present are quite different than the process of a time absent of the new innovation.  We 
may then imply that with each subsequent innovation, diffusion leads to an increased level of systemic 
complexity regarding the processes linking innovation to the market as a need to reconcile the impact 
of new technology with old.   
 In a market system uncertainty about the future necessarily affects innovation.  The process of 
production for the market requires the investing entity to subject some portion of its balance sheet to 
the immediate liquidity needs necessary to finance the wage bill and inputs before the gains of 
production from revenue as a compensating asset.  One consequence of the Industrial Revolution was 
that an increasing share of the economy consisted of large scale, capital intensive industries.  
Production on an industrial scale requires significant outlays of capital as well sophisticated, integrated 
markets for products from the basest of raw inputs to refined finished good.  Before a cent of profit 
may be realized the entire process must be financed either through retained profits or credit, which 
places the firm in the position to validate debts as they come due with revenues or stocks of money.   
  The decision to invest in the development of new technology weighs against perceptions of 
one’s ability to meet liquidity requirements in the future.  The level of liquidity preference becomes 
more important as the period between investment and return are increased, due to the capital and time 
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requirements to bring about a new, sophisticated technique.  The needs of advanced capital must be met 
by an accommodation in institutional organization capable of planning for its development and 
commercialization.  John Kenneth Galbraith shows in The New Industrial State that technological 
innovation produces a tendency toward increasingly complex techniques and tools, which large 
organizations best accommodate.   Galbraith (1967, pg. 49) forcefully links the size of the firm to the 
advent of technology: 
―...Size is the general servant of technology, not the special servant of profits.  The small firm cannot be 
restored by breaking the power of the larger ones.  It would require rather, the rejection of the 
technology which since earliest consciousness we are taught to applaud.  It would require that we have 
simple products made with simple equipment from readily available materials with unspecialized labor.  
Then the period of production would be short; the market would reliably provide the labor, equipment 
and materials required for production; there would be neither possibility or need for managing the 
market for the finished product...‖ 
 While Galbraith's observation remains obvious, the implications are quite important.  
Innovations resulting in a shift of production to capital intensive goods require a tremendous 
commitment of time during which liquidity is surrendered.  The need to plan arises in order to mitigate  
the retarding effect on investment due to the perception that a risky, uncertain world will render the 
firm unable to obtain the liquidity necessary to validate liability structures in the future
9
.  Planning can 
                         
9 Hyman P. Minsky, in “Stabilizing an Unstable Economy” argues that firms make 
investment decisions based upon their ability to have the stocks or current inflows of 
money necessary to cover the same period's outflow.  Therefore, the risk that an asset 
might lose value such that the liquidity necessary to “validate” the liability which 
generates the outflows falls short.  If credit cannot be obtained, then the asset is 
sold and debt-deflation crisis emerges.  In Part Four we shall go into further detail 
regarding this approach and establish a linkage to innovation. 
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only be effective at a scale of organization on the level of the modern corporation or the state.  
Furthermore, the organization must plan for the development of a market for the good.  The 
commitment of considerable capital to the development of new product, with a long production period, 
serves not current but future demand. 
 This section how the process of industrial innovation requires an institutional arrangement that 
stabilizes perceptions of risk and promotes planning.  We shall introduce Social Structure of 
Accumulation Theory as a framework for understanding periods of relative stability with respect to the 
conditions amenable to major investment in new capital formation.  We attempt to show that SSAs 
serve as an expectation-fixing force on the determination of subsequent innovation, enabling planning 
processes.  Furthermore, we discuss path dependence as a feature of SSAs and an expectation fixing 
institution.  Finally, we attempt to establish a fundamental relationship between  planned market 
activity against the institutional nexus of a social structure of accumulation.  It shall be argued that 
planned production for the market contributes significantly to the determination of path-dependent 
innovation, and that the resultant ―paths‖ serve to stabilize the financial aspects of the SSA. 
Social Structure of Accumulation Theory 
 In Contemporary Capitalism and its Crisis:  Social Structure of Accumulation Theory for the 
21st Century, Terrence McDonough, Michael Reich, and David M. Kotz (hereafter MRK,2010, pg. 1) 
define SSAs as an effort to reconcile long-way cycles of capitalist growth with institutional change.   
SSA theory attributes distinct periods of accumulation and stagnation to an holistic arrangement of 
institutional factors, which provide periods of relative stability.    Such factors include legal 
frameworks established in accordance with the rules governing jurisprudence.  Future decisions are 
based on earlier decisions, thereby carrying forward relics of history and placing them in the common 
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experience.   
 Organized bodies of legitimate power serve as institutional control measures.  For example, 
official state governing bodies create agendas which establish funding priorities in an ongoing effort to 
shape the course of investment.  Private institutions ranging in influence from the local grange to the 
US Chamber of Commerce, seek similar agendas and investment priorities.    
 Moreover, the particular network of institutional factors which constitute the SSA break down 
over time, giving way to a period of stagnation and the dissolution of that particular structure.  As the 
market undergoes a new period of expansion and accumulation, a new SSA emerges to carry on in a 
new period of relative stability. 
 McDonough et al (2010, pg. 2) explain that SSA theory rises from the need to reconcile some 
key insights from Marxian and Keynesian macroeconomic approaches.  In the former, McDonough et 
al (2010, pg. 2) suggest that the Marxian theme of class conflict, most notably the struggle for power 
between labor and capital, create uncertainty regarding the determination of profits.   
 SSA's Keynesian roots center on the importance of uncertainty.  Keynes (2003, pg. 285) 
stressed that expectations  regarding the future determine the level of output and employment.  We can 
conceptualize this operationally by considering that, as Wray (1990, pg. 10) points out, money plays 
the role of unit of account.  It has been argued extensively by PK
10
 monetary theorists that money 
cannot be neutral due to the fact that production must be financed in money denominated debts, subject 
                         
10 We shall offer a comprehensive treatment of the PK conception of money in the 
next section.  Chief proponents of this approach include Basil Moore, L. Randall 
Wray, and the late Hyman P. Minsky.  Additionally, Schumpeter can be associated 
with the endogenous money approach due to his recognition that innovations must 
be financed out of credit, since existing money flows were just sufficient to 
satisfy the existing circular flow of goods. This point is made in The Theory of 
Economic Development. 
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to changing conditions in terms.  An increase in liquidity preference results in insufficient levels of 
effective demand.  With liquidity preference determined by uncertainty institutional arrangements that 
have a limiting effect stabilize conditions for investment.  MRK (2010,pg. 3) suggest: 
 ―When a social structure of accumulation is in place, many of the determinants of the profit rate 
 are secured, and long-run expectations of profitability are stabilized.‖   
 The Marxian theme of class conflict as an internal contradiction fits nicely as a determinant of 
the profit rate in question, thereby linking it to the Kenyesian problem of uncertainty.  Coupled with the 
requirement to stabilize expectations regarding investment over a long period – where retained profits 
or credit are required to finance innovation – SSA theory serves to explain how institutional 
arrangements limit the destabilizing aspects of economic change. 
 Victor Lippet (2010, pp. 45-6) further defines SSA theory by explaining how institutions limit 
perceived risk.  Institutions – broadly defined to allow for customs, norms and habits of thought, while 
retaining the narrow case of the individual organization
11
 - that work systemically to favor investment 
serve as SSAs.  As Lippet (2010, pg. 46)  carefully disclaims, deductive proof of the stabilizing 
function of SSAs is not possible.  However, we may apply this framework to distinct periods of 
capitalist growth.  Looking at what SSA theorists (1996, Gordon, Weisskopf, and Bowles)
12
 describe as 
the Post-War WWII SSA we can see the stabilizing effect on profit expectations of the capital-labor 
accord.  In economic history, the capital-labor accord describes the post-war peace between labor and 
                         
11 Institutions in the narrow sense may have a well defined effect on the 
broadly defined institutions of norm, custom and habit.  For instance, the 
financial system can be thought of as in institution by which the whole of 
money convention rests.  Norms relating the human experience to customs 
involving money must be reconciled in the cultural sense in terms of the 
Federal Reserve, Treasury, and the intermediary banking super-structure.   
12 Courtesy to Lippet (2010, pg. 48) for the reference. 
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capital.  In exchange for fringe benefits, stability and cost of living pay increases labor would not strike 
and the threaten the largest corporations with lost productivity.  In exchange for higher labor costs 
owners of the commanding heights of the economy enjoyed a period of stable expectations.  Lippet 
(2010, pg. 50) elaborates on the importance of the capital – labor accord in limiting risk: 
―  The capital-labor accord addressed one of the central contradictions in capitalist economies...capital 
can be 'too strong' or 'too weak' relative to labor.  If capital is too strong, wages will be kept down, but 
that in turn threatens the maintenance of aggregate demand, leading to a potential crisis of under 
consumption.  Profits will be high in production, but sales will be curtailed by limited purchasing power, 
discouraging new investment.  On the other, if capital is too weak high wages will limit profitability by 
raising production costs...‖ 
 The balance of power between capital and labor proves useful as an example of the stabilizing 
benefit of the SSA if we remind ourselves of the nature of innovation of technology, advancing in 
technological complexity, in a market economy.  Galbraith's
13
 revelation that the long production 
period and high capital requirements of progressively complex technology requires planning, provides 
a background against which to place the importance of the capital-labor accord in supporting the Post-
WWII SSA.  The ability to limit the riskiness of an investment by fixing, albeit loosely, the determinants 
of cost, then the firm may make a calculated bet against the future.  Likewise, the dominance of the 
modern corporation in relation to the market allows for fixed expectations through the administration of 
prices.   
 In an effort to establish a heterodox price theory, Fred Lee presents a model of pricing for the  
market as administered by the modern business enterprise.  Lee (1996, pg. 88) argues prices are 
                         
13 Quoted passage from New Industrial State 
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administered by firms run by individuals or managerial committees.  Lee suggests that established 
procedures or processes that determine cost, depreciation, and output are administered by the managers 
of the firm to the market.  Furthermore, these procedures must comply with the institutional framework 
set legislation.  Laws which change how the existing tax structure affects the production process must 
be factored into the price administration of firms. 
 The effect of price administration mirrors that of the cost stabilizing techniques, such as the 
capital-labor accord, and allows for coherent planning.  The ability to reliably administer prices and set 
costs, allows the firm to predict its liability structures in the future, a critical determinant of liquidity 
flows.  Lee (1996, pg. 90) suggests that prices are set for periods of time based upon a production 
 cycle under which the inputs are financed.  Furthermore, prices change over time as the cost of 
production changes. 
 The ability of the firm to finance investment activity depends upon its size, power and access to 
liquidity.  As Hyman P. Minsky (1986, pp. 171-2) clearly lays out, firms must rely upon retained profits 
or lines of credit to finance investment, since the revenues attributable to the resulting production 
process from the investment flow exist only in the future, potentially.  While a stream of revenue may 
result from the investment commitment, the current wage bill must be met with an existing flow of 
liquidity from any annuity.  In the event that a firm wishes to embark upon a lengthy development of a 
new process or product, one which lacks an existing market, they must do so in a manner which 
minimizes the risk that the gains to commercialization of the innovation fail to outweigh the cost of 
commitment of a new liability structure.  It follows that as technology increases in capital intensity, its 
diffusion requires a rather organized structure of planning and finance. 
Path Dependence, Investment and Innovation 
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 In a market economy, inter-temporal flows  of credits and debits are determined by the annuities 
of both assets and liabilities.  Contractual payment agreements based upon the expectation of future 
income generated by production yields are sensitive to the risk that the underlying asset might fail to 
maintain the stream of payments necessary for its validation.  Therefore, investment which results in  
path-dependent development, tightens the expectation that the stream of revenue generated will 
validate the associated liability in the appropriate period.  We further define path-dependence and work 
to place it in context with the focusing aspect of social structures of accumulation. 
 We find in path dependence the ―unifying principle‖ needed to focus an emergent SSA.  As an 
institution, path dependence in any form that affects the flow of money over time may provide stability 
to the SSA.  Paul David's seminal contribution of Clio and Economics of QWERTY on the theory of 
path dependence provides an analytical framework for understanding the innovation process within the 
milieu of a social structure of accumulation.  David (1985, pg. 332) argues the outcome of any 
particular process may be heavily influenced by a non-local event(s) in time.   The decision to invest in 
one novel process over the other, especially one tied to a liability position in production finance, would 
qualify as influential to the future course of investment decisions.  When the diffusion of innovation 
requires such a considerable level of capital, technology notwithstanding, a divergent subsequent 
innovation proves costly.   
 David (1985, pg. 332-6) explains that the QWERTY keyboard arrangement emerged as an 
engineering solution to the tendency for type-bar machines to jam when the end user typed too fast.  
Additionally, the arrangement allows for the salesman to peck out the word ―typewriter‖ using only the 
top row, reducing the likelihood that the demonstration might fail to impress the client.  As 
improvements in the design of the typewriter relaxed the physical constraint on typing speed, 
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competing designs emerged.  Despite the promise of enhanced efficiency and a more productive 
clerical labor force, the QWERTY arrangement persists today due to self-reinforcing mechanisms that 
approach an asymptotic state of ―lock-in.‖  This mechanism implies a degree of cost associated with the 
decision to adopt an non-complementary standard to the prevailing technology that approaches the 
path-dependent state. 
 David (1985, pp. 334-6) points to a range of costs associated with deviating from path 
dependent innovation.  The decision of a firm to purchase typing machines with the QWERTY 
configuration creates a positive externality for the QWERTY trained labor force.    The fact that 
individuals need no retraining on operation of the typewriter, lowered the cost of adopting QWERTY 
rather than selecting a different configuration.  This early advantage carries a cascading effect on an 
ever increasing probability that QWERTY keyboard will be selected in the future.  We may extend this 
example to say that markets integrated with a path-dependent production process provide a further 
positive externality to any subsequent innovation that proves complementary.  The self-reinforcing 
mechanism of ―lock in‖ eventually approaches unity with respect to the probability that a future 
innovation will complement the established path.  The call and answer between a path-dependent 
innovation and complementary adaptations, always emerging in response, can be thought of as a 
process of co-evolution.   
 In an effort to bring the economy – a complex, evolving system – into a realm of analysis 
suitable for explaining the dynamic nature of change, W. Brian Arthur (1988, pg. 209) argues that self-
reinforcing mechanisms
14
 create ―a multiplicity of asymptotic states or possible emergent structures.‖  
                         
14 Arthur refines his definition of self-reinforcing mechanisms by offering a 
host of synonyms that describe the same process:  increasing returns; 
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Positive feedback loops create emergent market structures that have outcomes along path-dependent, 
asymptotic ―lock-ins‖ as a result of conditions in the early phases of its development.   
 Arthur (1988, pg. 210)  suggests four likely causes for a state in which economic structure 
undergo processes of self-reinforcement.  First, and most notably, the large-scale capital requirements 
of industrial production, wherein economies of scale generate a negative relationship between unit cost 
and output.  The increasing returns to scale inherent of large scale, organized production introduce a 
selection bias favoring concentration among producers in the market.  In order to validate the liability 
structures  associated with production on the scale that makes possible increasing returns, a significant 
share of the total market is required for each firm.  This introduces barriers to entry on the part of 
latecomers or small firms, that cannot capture significant share of the market to facilitate production on 
a scale that would generate sustained accumulation. 
 Arthur (1988, pg. 210) adds that learning and coordination effects, as well as adaptive 
expectations each account for the presence of self-reinforcement.  It is worth our time to cover some of 
these aspects in further detail.   Arthur (1988, pg. 210) accepts the argument by Arrow (1962) and 
Rosenberg (1982) that learning effects serve to lower the cost of production of a given good through 
innovations in production technique, thereby increasing the likelihood that the good viz-a-viz 
substitutes will be selected in the market.  Furthermore, learning effects attributable to continued 
replication of a given production process may result in product improvements, increasing the 
probability that its market shall remain. 
 Along similar lines of reason, coordination effects, suggests Arthur (1988, pg. 212), create 
                                                                                    
cumulative causation, deviation-amplification mutual causal processes; 
virtuous and vicious cycles; threshold effects; and non-convexity.   
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network externality that induce the ―going along‖ effect in selecting diffusion patterns.  The benefits 
that accrue commonly among widespread adopters of a path-dependent tool, technique or process 
spring from a ―self-fulfilling prophecy‖ effect based upon a mutual expectation between consumer and 
producer.  In order to better demonstration the impact of coordination effects, let us examine a few case 
examples where such effects yielded a path-dependent outcome in relationship to the determination of 
subsequent innovation and the flow of investment. 
 The development of the railroad in the United States serves as a representative innovation under 
conditions of self-reinforcement.  First, the large-scale, capital-intensive nature of the railroad implies 
increasing returns to scale.  From 1839 to 1860 the extent of railroad networks throughout the economy 
explodes from three to thirty thousand miles; a flow of investment to railroads over canals at a rate of 
500%
15
.  As the railroad spread through the economy, regions would benefit from the coordination 
effects of selecting complementary standards in railroad construction.   
 Old localized track gauge standards, while once the result of an earlier ―lock-in‖ to one of many 
equilibria, require a significant outlay of commitment of liquidity to adopt a different standard.  
Mokyr
16
 explains that despite the relative independence between rail lines, where some owned as much 
as one thousand miles of track based upon a proprietary gauge, the increasing extent to which the 
railroad was responsible for the transportation needs of the market overcame the cost of switching track 
gauge.  The cost according to Mokyr was indeed dear:  in a coordinated effort, the Illinois Central shut 
down normal operations on July 29, 1881 just long enough for a ready army of labor – a crew of three 
thousand – to modify the track gauge along five-hundred forty-seven miles of the line.  The maneuver 
                         
15 Source:  Joel Mokyr, “Railroads and Nineteenth-Century American Economy 
16 Ibid pg. 430 
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successfully completed within the span of a single day! 
 We have shown that self-reinforcing forces steer the flow of investment towards path-dependent 
processes and institutions.  The expectation-fixing quality of an investment good, namely its ability to 
lower the perception of risk, acts as a focusing device, a lever of influence on the formation of 
institutions which together support a network of interdependence and stability.  Social structure of 
accumulation theory, frames the emergent phenomena that over time form the basis for the expectations 
necessary to induce investment, capable of organizing the planning necessary in order to meet 
established goals.  The nature of innovation under these conditions becomes one of ―lock-in‖ to path 
dependent states of punctuated equilibrium
17
. 
 This analysis has sought to integrate the role of money as a fundamental element of the social 
structure of accumulation.  Of central concern to the financier is the health and condition of the balance 
sheet under which production is financed.  The need to finance out of credit the necessary outlays for 
the level of capital formation that is sufficient to result in an economy of scale, suggests that the course 
of innovation in production processes must remain complementary to the underlying asset that 
continues to validate the liability structure.  In other words, investment tends to flow towards the 
development of new techniques, products, and processes that reinforce the expectation that revenue 
from future operations will continue to retire debts as they come due.  In Part 4 we develop in greater 
detail a framework by which we can place innovation in a monetary system of market production.  Yet 
for now, we proceed to our analysis concerning innovation and social change.   
 
                         
17 Stephen J. Gould 
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Part Three:  Innovation and Social Change 
 To explain the evolution of social systems requires a thoughtful consideration of the processes 
which shape institutional innovation.  The objective of this inquiry remains to establish a framework 
wherein innovations in the realms of technology and of social structures, that direct the employment of 
these ever changing material artifacts, connect to steer the course of human development, and the 
subsequent creation of new conditions. 
 This section presents a model for social change which rests upon the philosophical insights of 
the eminent pragmatist philosopher, John Dewey.  Dewey insightfully presents a mode of inquiry 
appropriate for complex, dynamical systems.  The choice to employ Dewey as an intellectual guide in 
this analysis stems from the recognition that as an open, evolutionary system of social provisioning, 
observation of the forces of change acting on market processes must come from within.  Dewey's 
insistence that social problems be studied from a perspective of process has produced a number of 
valuable insights which provide the basis for our evolutionary paradigm.   
 Dewey in The Quest for Certainty explains that the Greek mode of rational formalism
18
 persists 
in modern science and philosophy, despite its lack of relevance in light of the discovery of evolutionary 
processes yielding in outcomes dependent on historical conditions
19
.  An ontology based upon pure and 
                         
18 Dewey predicates this argument on the assumption that the whole of Greek 
thought and mysticism lie in the search to explain the stars as they were 
heavenly bodies in the sky.  The celestial ideal of these heavenly bodies 
becomes one of perfect motion in unity.  Immutable states of perfect 
equilibrium. 
19 This excerpt from The Quest for Certainty serves as the first part of the 
second chapter titled, “The Great Philosophic Separation” in Joseph 
Ratner's reader John Dewey's Philosophy.  This work was part of the Modern 
Library collection, circa 1939. 
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immutable forms, the attainment of which becomes the ultimate human endeavor, reflects what Dewey 
suggests as ―systemizations in rational form of the content of Greek religious and artistic beliefs.‖ 
 While this study avoids approaches which aim to establish a model for equilibrium, which hails 
from the Greek tradition, further consideration of Dewey's critique helps establish some background for 
reflection on the problem of institutional innovation and course of future development  Dewey (1939, 
pg. 287) on the development of the Greek tradition offers:  ―the belief that the divine encompasses the 
world was detached from its mythical context and made the basis for philosophy, and it became also the 
foundation of physical science.‖  Dewey goes on to point out that ―telling the story of the universe in 




 Logic, therefore, emerges as an example of institutional innovation.  It arises as a new technique 
in philosophical inquiry.  As an institution, logic provides a focusing lens on the generation of potential, 
future knowledge.  The application of logic against the reflections of experience codifies the results in a 
way that carries information about the past, and provides a basis for fixing mutually held expectations 
throughout the social nexus.  Furthermore, the evolution of institutions through time, constrained by 
conventions based upon logic, produces adaptations toward a scientific end.   
 Following Dewey, it shall be argued that institutions change under processes that typically 
exhibit path-dependent outcomes.  Innovation of institutions heavily depends upon the influence of 
prevailing, initial conditions which are shaped by historical conditions and outcome of previous 
innovations.  Moreover, institutions serve to filter and focus the information that flows through social 
networks, the basis for subsequent diffusion of innovation.  Therefore, social change through 
                         
20 Ibid 
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institutional innovation remains constrained by path-dependence and suggests a high degree of positive 
feedbacks within the system.  Since the market operates based upon conventionally held expectations, 
we must examine how these conventions emerge and persist.  Paul David (pg. 205) argues that 
institutions serve as path-dependent carriers of history.  Through institutions the past is preserved and 
continues to exert an influence over the course of future innovation.   
 This analysis proceeds with the argument that emergent phenomena resulting in institutional 
change, must reconcile with the constraints of path-dependence as it relates to the extant set of 
conditions.  Therefore, the course of innovation reflects a persistent rigidity in culture, attributable to 
self-reinforcement of social conventions.   We begin with a consideration of David's application of 
path-dependence theory to institutions. 
 According to David (pg. 290) systems possessing path-dependent processes suggest the 
presence of ―non-ergodicity.‖  Simply defined, non-ergodic systems consist of processes that yield a 
stochastic probability distribution sensitive to time.  In other words, the likelihood of predicting the 
future in the absence of historical information, based only upon current conditions as explanatory 
variables, is impossibly low.  David suggests: 
 ―systems possessing this property... are unable to shake off the effects of past events and do not 
 have a limiting, invariant probability distribution that is continuous over the enter state space.‖ 
In plain terms, the events of the past play a direct role in forming the probability distribution at any 
given time of a stochastic process.  As time progresses the outcomes of each iteration depend more on 
the consequences of previous iterations.  Thus, institutional innovation acting as force for evolution 
within the system, drifts toward a path-dependent outcome. 
 An analogy here might serve useful in our effort to drive home the importance attributed to non-
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ergodic systemic change.  Imagine a river flowing through time.  Let us suggest that the river 
meanders, alternating in a serpentine pattern across a flat floodplain.  At the closest scale of observation 
manageable, we clearly see that suspended in the water, sediments float downstream as long as the flow 
remains stable.  Since the velocity of the flow is a function of the radius from the center of the bend and 
the extent of the river, water flows slower closer to the inside of the bend relative to the outside.  This 
arrangement causes two things to happen simultaneously:  1) sediments to fall to the river bed near the 
bank and 2) bank cutting by faster flows on the outside.   
 If we let time take on discrete segments as process iterations then we can see how the river 
illustrates path-dependent change.  With each iteration the probability that sediment falls or floats 
depends increasingly on the outcome of the previous iteration.  As the river drops sediment in one 
instance it skews the probability distribution of the next iteration to favor the chance that similar 
sediment will carry the trend.  The far side evolution mirrors the near side just described, in that each 
time sediment is carried away it increases the likelihood that the same will occur in the future. It has 
eroded away sufficient material to increase the radius of the turn, thereby increasing the flow. 
 If we reversed each iteration, like peeling back the layers of an onion, we might find the once 
straight river began the process of meandering flow from the minor obstruction of a rock in the stream.  
The chance that the river will alter its direction of flow, ever so slightly to trigger serpentine flow, is 
much like the ―accidents of history‖ that provide the early conditions to trigger self-reinforcement in 
investment.   
 While the literature on path-dependence typically focuses on explaining why investment favors 
a particular set of procedures, techniques or tools in the production of a good for the market, David (pg. 
291) readily extends the theory to explain similar phenomena in institutional innovation.  David (pg. 
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219-292) argues that institutions guide individual behavior through conventionally held, mutually 
consistent expectations.  Furthermore, conventions follow a path-dependent course of innovation due to 
their inherent need to stable expectations among a network of uncoordinated, dispersed agents.  
Decisions by individuals are made in light of new information, yet shaped, constrained and formed by 
the conventional wisdom of mutually consistent expectations.  For David (pg. 291) conventions align 
the expectations of a collective soup of individual agents along a mutually consistent lexicon of 
understanding.  While David applies this relationship to the problem of coordination games, we extend 
this simple observation as a general pattern in the formation of networks connecting individuals within 
groups. 
 The nexus of conventions of various degree and importance carries through time information 
which describes the relationship of the individual to the group.  Moreover, these networks of 
conventional wisdom (e.g.  mores, habits of thought, and customs) provide structure to pathways of 
information flow within and between groups.  As institutions evolve, the network in which institutions 
exist adapts, necessarily changing the way information diffuses through the social nexus.   
 Networks perform a number of functions in the social system.  First, they connect the 
individuals within a group and allow the broadcast of information both at individual and collective 
levels of experience.  In the former, individuals reflecting upon personal experience may transmit such 
information to the public sphere.  The latter of course provides the basis for reflection against which 
mutually consistent expectations provide structure to individual decisions. 
 Second, networks serve to shape the flow of information through the social system.  Due to 
technical, physical or institutional constraints the diffusion of new information through the network 
tends to exhibit a bias towards information that is best suited for transmission through the network.  
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This brings forth a rather important implication regarding the nature of innovation among social 
institutions.  Established networks along groups of individuals that interact together in a larger social 
system, are further reinforced by the relative ease with which institutional innovation is supportive of 
the existing order flows through the network. 
 The abstract nature of institutional innovation as an iterative process of information diffusion 
through social networks, benefits greatly by rooting the implicit theoretical constructs in real world 
examples.  Let us suppose that a little league baseball game sets the stage for a simple network.  
Networks emerge as the potential pathways for the exchange of information between the individual and 
group.  As the proud parents of the little leaguer participate in the social activities generally associated 
with such an event – cheering, conspicuous consumption, side conversation, physical expression – 
there exist a number of processes underway which account for the function of the network.  In 
accordance with custom and convention, parents communicate information regarding their experience 
of the event to the rest of the group by way of the network.  Cheering is heard by others in the 
immediate vicinity.  Since cheering carries the precedence of acceptance, and is generally 
complementary of the network that transmits the inherent information, then its subsequent diffusion 
through the network reinforces the convention.  Additionally, the network remains constrained by the 
physical constraints implied by geographical coincidence.  In order for the network to emerge, the 
parents of these child athletes must collect in a common location.  The network associated with the 
little league game, therefore only exists during a game.  
 Observation of common modes of conveyance yields further insight into the geographical 
nature of some social networks.  When vehicles drive down the freeway a network emerges that 
connects the individual driver with a larger group of drivers, through the relay of observed billboards.  
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Again, the network is physically constrained by the geographical limits of billboard placement around a 
freeway, the speed of travel along the highway, and conventional wisdom held to be mutually 
consistent within a group of drivers.  Hence, information in this network tends to flow unilaterally, as 
drivers must passively consume the information conveyed by the billboards due to the obvious limits of 
operating a motor vehicle.  The mode of ―broadcast communication‖ where information predominately 
flows through the network, where immediate critique and response is limited or non-existent, implies a 
degree of asymmetry in institutional innovation, which biases subsequent changes in the network 
towards information inherent in the existing order.  In other words, the information broadcast in 
roadside advertisements is selected not based upon equilibrating forces selecting information on the 
basis of meaning or importance, but the whims of a powerful vested interest in the social structure of 
accumulation. 
 One implication of path-dependent evolution in social institutions is the possibility that some  or 
certain groups become more powerful than others over time.  Recent research in the science of social 
networks suggests a high degree of asymmetry with respect to power and influence, which serves to 
reinforce divisions between groups and place some in position of higher influence than others.  
Nicholas Christakis and James Fowler employ social network analytical techniques to analyze the 
effect of group dynamics over time.  Christakis and Fowler (2007, 2008, 2009) find that individuals 
acting as ―central nodes‖ exert influence through the network, up to an average of three degrees of 
separation.  Moreover, central nodes have a higher than average likelihood of influencing the behavior 
of non-central nodes, suggestive of self-reinforcing dynamics. 
 While contributions of Christakis and Fowler focus on explaining how 
seemingly personal decisions regarding health (smoking, poor diet, etc) spread 
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through social networks, they insist that dynamical network analysis applies to a 
wide range of social phenomena, including the innovation of institutions over time.  
Fowler and Jeon (2007) apply network analysis in an effort to explain the evolution 
of Supreme Court decisions over time.  Using a sample of 30,288 majority opinions 
from the bench, a network connecting citations between 1754 and 2000 shows a 
pattern of stare decisis.  According to Fowler and Jeon (2007, pp. 16-29) legal 
institutions evolve in a manner that reinforces stare decisis, latin for “stand by 
decisions.”  Courts honor the majority decision of a case, which serves to lock 
the law into a state of legal path-dependence. 
 The rigidness implied by institutional “lock-in” in legal precedence 
suggests that over time, asymmetrical effects of the law across the network with 
respective to the distribution of power, may become institutionalized.  In the 
capitalist system of monetary production, money flows through nodes of central 
influence established by institutionalized and asymmetrical legal protection.  
Similarly, relative influence depends upon access to money, creating a mutually 
reinforcing relationship.  
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Part 4:  Innovation and the Monetary System of Production 
  Previous sections of this analysis claim that money serves as a determinant in the 
process of systemic evolution.  Money possesses special properties that establish its dominance in 
relation to other institutions within the economic system.  First and most importantly, money performs 
the task of linking the future with the present in terms of the material goods of society through the 
establishment of contracts.  The use of contracts in the functioning of a market system based upon 
private property is so ubiquitous it hardly warrants mention.  However, the recognition that money 
performs the duty of the contract instrument - the job of linking the future with the present - remains a 
profound revelation, that any theory that seeks to reconcile money and real production should not 
overlook. 
 The use of contracts ranging in formality from an informal handshake to formal, legally binding 
agreements, arises from the desire to attenuate the risk associated with an uncertain future.  When an 
individual trades some portion of her current income for a contract vehicle that entitles her to a future 
stream of income, it emerges from the fear that her current income in the future will fail to satisfy some 
desired level of consumption in the future.  Of course, the individual level of risk aversion determines 
in large part what portion of current consumption flows towards savings.  However, in the aggregate 
varying perceptions of risk on the part of households, firms, and financial institutions determine the 
level of investment in the economy, ceteris paribus.   
 Uncertainty about the future state of one’s material well being is a central problem in 
economics.  L. Randall Wray (1990, pg. 11) observes that fear of the unknowable future is central to 
Keynes’ monetary theory.  The liquidity enjoyed by holding cash provides a feeling of safety; fear of 
the unknown may overwhelm the need to place money in a productive position of investment.   
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 Part two of this paper argued that technological innovation emerging from the Industrial 
Revolution increased the scale of industry in order to accommodate the needs of large, capital intensive 
production.  Production on an industrial scale increases the period between investment and return to 
such a degree that the inputs to production must be financed.  The establishment of a contract for 
payment between the banker and the firm connects the institution of money to innovations, by 
promoting only changes that improve the monetary position of the firm.  The banker has little interest 
in breaking the rents of its chief customers, increasing the risk of default.  This section aims to make 
explicit the link between credit, money and the production process. 
 This section argues that in a market system of production, money takes on the special role as the 
institutional guide by which innovations diffuse through the economy.  Furthermore, money becomes 
the subject of innovation itself as it undergoes a process of co-evolution with the market.  In support of 
these claims we adopt the endogenous money approach of the post-Keynesian school.  The post-
Keynesian conception of money presents a useful analytical tool for explaining the behavior of markets 
under the uncertainty of time.  The emphasis on how money flows through an uncertain world 
integrates with the overall historical approach of this inquiry. 
 This section sets out to establish the endogenous money approach as an appropriate theoretical 
tool for explaining production in capitalist markets.  Next, we attempt to connect the contractual 
property of money to the process of innovation and argue the flow of money shapes subsequent 
evolution of the system.  Finally, we examine the mechanisms under which money adapts in response 
to changes in the institutional framework of the market. 
Endogenous Money and the Capitalist Mode of Production 
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 Keynes emphasized the economy as a system of monetary production.  Wallace Peterson (1996, 
pg. 151) argues that in contrast to the premise that money is neutral, Keynes integrates money as an 
endogenous element of ―modern systems of market capitalism,‖ suggesting a non-neutral role.  As an 
embedded institution, money touches every aspect of the production process.  Performing the 
accounting function in a system of private contracts, money becomes an instrument acceptable to settle 
debts universally (Wray 1990, pg. 8).  Therefore, the production process seeks to establish a flow of 
money for the sake of settling a debts.   
 Following from the revelation that modern capitalist markets rest upon a system of monetary 
production, the post-Keynesian school analyzes the way money enters the economy endogenously.  
Wray (1990, pg.14) defines money as: 
 ―...the terms in which debts are written; it is the unit of account; it is the balance sheet item 
 created as part of a forward contract. Thus, money is a stock created to facilitate flows.‖ 
Rather than developing from the barter system, Wray (1990, pg. 9) suggests that money emerges as 
property is created, as a means of accounting for contractual flows of property through time. 
Money and Innovation 
 Schumpeter, Keynes and chief proponents of the PK monetary approach attribute to the 
financial system a significant share of the decision to invest.  Schumpeter (2008, pg. 74) argues that the 
banker, ―stands between those who wish to form new combinations and the possessors of productive 
means.‖  In other words, the entrepreneur must submit to the banker in order to integrate an innovation 
into the production process.  Minsky (1986, pg 224) offers that in the modern financial system, banks 
expand their balance sheets in order to lend for the sake of investment.  Furthermore, the firms ability 
to meet its contractual obligations as they come due, ―depends upon the quasi-rents that capital assets 
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earn when used in production,‖ (Minsky 1986, pg. 224).  The relationship between debtor and creditor 
ultimately hinges upon balance sheet positions in which the creditor exert influences, albeit indirectly, 
over the formation of means of production.  Furthermore, as an increasing share of output throughout 
the economy requires the extension of credit from the financial system, the goals of each entity – 
producers and bankers – grow together in a symbiosis, each mutually supporting the needs of the other. 
Minksy (1986, pg. 228) suggests that ―because bankers live in the same expectational [sic] climate as 
businessmen, profit-seeking bankers will find ways to accommodate their customers.‖ 
  Against the notion that credits and debits flow inter-temporally through the balance sheets of 
firms and banks, arises the pervasive phenomena of existential uncertainty.  As Wray (1990, pp. 8-9) 
notes, private property destroys the collective safety net of surplus; the future must be secured not by 
individual rather than social contracts.  In each period, the need to ensure a steady flow of quasi-rents 
or profits dominates the production process, rendering it subordinate to the end goal of accumulating 
money.  With the advent of the large corporation as the dominant institution in the US 
economy and an integrated network of financiers supporting its hegemony, the manner of innovation as 
it relates to the social system of production serves to reinforce the status quo, rather than invoke the 
―perennial vale of creative destruction
21
.‖   
The Evolution of Money 
  Wray (1990, pp. 2-14) illustrates that money emerges with the institution of private property,it 
predates markets and serves as the unit of account of essentially a ―wheat now for more wheat later 
proposition.
22
‖ Money as the contract vehicle for inter-temporal trade of private property, as well as 
                         
21   Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Development 
 
22   Wray uses the analogy of wheat to demonstrate the contractual nature of a market based 
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claims to the flows of revenue associated with such property, undergoes iterations of innovation. Wray 
points to Keynes' argument in The General Theory that each commodity carries an ―own-rate‖ of 
interest – or a premium by which the holder parts with some portion of it – and that over time 
commodities of lowest ―carrying cost‖ emerge to account for the purpose of universal credit-debit 
clearance. Thus, history shows that money evolves through time to perform the role as unit of account; 
the universally accepted means of retiring debt.   At earlier stages in history, grain served as unit of 
account, later precious metal, and now credit money based upon state debt. 
  Money continues to serve as the object of innovation. Minksy (1986, pp. 225-7) argues that 
bankers constantly seek new instruments which serve the purpose of retiring debt. Due to institutional 
constraints, such as attempts by the Federal Reserve of restricting the behavior of intermediary banks 
through interest rate targets, banks come under tremendous pressure to supply the money necessary to 
validate a complex network of interdependent balance sheets. Moreover, the internal logic of the 
capitalist mode of production requires an ever increasing supply of money in order to sustain the open 
process of pecuniary accumulation.   
  Aside from the systemic need to supply funds for the sake of production and for the validation 
of maturing debts, there exists a predatory aspect to the banking system that exerts pressure on banks to 
development new liabilities to issue, thus promoting growth. At the heart of the banking motive lives 
the desire of the bank managers to accumulate ―personal fortunes‖, a wholly separate function from the 
traditional purpose of extending credit to credit worthy customers. Minsky (1986, pg. 238) argues: 
―The typical professional bank president is not a rich man when he starts his career. As a bank president 
                                                                                    
upon private property, where risk premiums associated with the uncertainty of lending “wheat” to 
another individual account for the time lapse in which the wheat is no longer immediately available 
to the lender. The contract in wheat becomes a debt which takes on the properties of money. 
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he is a hired hand trying to achieve a personal fortune. But given the tax structure, it is difficult to 
accumulate a fortune by saving out of income; the most efficient route for a business executive is by 
way of stock options and the capital gains that accrue as the stock market price per share rises.   As 
holders of stock options, bank management is interested in the price, on the exchanges, of their bank's 
shares.‖ 
In the banking sector the price of a stock depends highly upon the size of the bank in terms of market 
capitalization and coverage. The larger the bank, the higher the price. Bank managers wishing to 
maximize individual hoards of money, promote activities which increase the balance sheets of their 
financial institutions. 
 




 Throughout this study we attempt to establish innovation as a function of an evolutionary social 
system.  Groups of individuals form networks that organize and direct the productive activities of the 
social system, shaping the emergent state in a manner complimentary to the existing order.  We set out 
to reconcile innovation -  as it relates to a complex, dynamical system - with the structure of the very 
networks that embed each institution in an interdependent social fabric.  Like a thread, the institution of 
money weaves through the social system, connecting groups and individuals in a global market.   
 Social network analysis in the fields of medicine and computational social science suggest 
―nodes‖ of power and influence scattered throughout the social system, which act as relays in the 
transmission of information, most notably cultural signals.  To act as the node implies a degree of 
centrality in one's personal relationship network.  Not all agents in the network are created equal in 
terms of power.  Rather, influence within the network reinforced and magnified by self-reinforcing 
mechanisms common to evolutionary systems.  In our social system of monetary production, money's 
role as the unit of account by which all debts are settled, only strengthens its power over time. 
  We framed our analysis from an historical perspective to highlight the interplay between the 
extant and emergent system states.  Veblen's ―habitual method of procedure‖ refers to the extant 
structure of the system; the rigidness of path-dependent institutions.  The emergent arise from the 
material consequences of historical developments.  The bias in probability to the sort of change in 
institutions and technology that preserves historical procedures provides rigidity to the system.  Path 
dependence in all manner of innovation gives structure to the social system. Thinking about the 
economy as part of a social system that evolves through historical time highlights the irreversible 
nature of change.  So called, ―accidents of history‖ determine in large part the long-term path of 
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innovation.  Path-dependence literature suggests that a system can ―lock-in‖ to an arbitrary vector of 
evolution.  The past persists in the memory of the system; some institutions and techniques persistent 
through history. 
 The institution of money arises from the emergence of private property.  We argue that in a 
social system that relies on markets as its production and provisioning mechanism, money ties all 
elements of the system in one common network.  In systems of production where discrete segments of 
time require payment in money on debts, pecuniary gains become the end of society; money becomes 
the subject of innovation.  
 This paper has emphasized the process of change.  Starting with the Industrial Revolution we 
begin to tell a story about the continuous nature of change in the economy.  We adopt Mokyr's 
knowledge which describes a feedback between propositional and prescriptive knowledge.  The 
Industrial Revolution can be described as an explosive period in innovation, where major 
breakthroughs in science were met with ingenious application to the physical world.  Mokyr's 
frameworks suggests that the relation of propositional to prescriptive knowledge post 1800 set off a 
positive feedback in innovation – some innovations caused the base of propositional knowledge to 
increase, further increasing the chance of an addition to the set of prescriptive knowledge.  The 
telegraph comes to mind as a technological change that extended access to more individuals the real of 
science.  
 Consequential to the tremendous investment in fixed capital during the Industrial Revolution we 
have an increase in the need for organized economic planning.  Galbraith makes the point, as the ―...Size 
is the general servant of technology‖ which increases the need to prepare the market for production.  Planning 
becomes necessary in order to stabilize profits versus costs, and to prepare the market for future consumption.  
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This analysis has argued that SSA theory presents a powerful analytical tool for explaining the nature of 
organizational planning for market production.  Furthermore, we propose that path-dependence serves as an 
expectation-fixing device – a cultural artifact that smooths expectations regarding the volatility of the future.  
 Out of an evolutionary framework we view the social system of production as  fluid, 
yet sometimes viscous, but always changing.  By taking the long view on the subject 
of economic change, we see the effect of power and tradition in the application of 
Homo sapiens' most unique trait:  the power to bend our constraints just a little 
further in an act of defiance against the odds of extinction.  And through the 
recognition that convention and social pressure shape the course of our collective 
efforts to persist, we hope to approach the problem of social policy informed, and 
ready to innovate.   
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